Consider the following problem: given a metric space, some of whose points are "clients," select a set of at most k facility locations to minimize the average distance from the clients to their nearest facility. This is just the well-studied k-median problem, for which many approximation algorithms and hardness results are known. Note that the objective function encourages opening facilities in areas where there are many clients, and given a solution, it is often possible to get a good idea of where the clients are located. This raises the following quandary: what if the locations of the clients are sensitive information that we would like to keep private? Is it even possible to design good algorithms for this problem that preserve the privacy of the clients?
Introduction
Consider the following problems:
• Assign people using a social network to one of two servers so that most pairs of friends are assigned to the same server.
• Open some number of HIV treatment centers so that the average commute time for patients is small.
• Open a small number of drop-off centers for undercover agents so that each agent is able to visit some site convenient to her (each providing a list of acceptable sites). The above problems can be modeled as instances of well-known combinatorial optimization problems: respectively the minimum cut problem, the k-median problem, and the set cover problem. Good heuristics have been designed for these problems, and hence they may be considered well-studied and solved. However, in the above scenarios and in many others, the input data (friendship relations, medical history, agents' locations) represent sensitive information about individuals. Data privacy is a crucial design goal, and it may be vastly preferable to use a private algorithm that gives somewhat suboptimal solutions to a non-private optimal algorithm. This leads us to the following central questions: Given that the most benign of actions possibly leaks sensitive information, how should we design algorithms for the above problems? What are the fundamental trade-offs between the utility of these algorithms and the privacy guarantees they give us?
The notion of privacy we consider in this paper is that of differential privacy. Informally, differential privacy guarantees that the distribution of outcomes of the computation does not change significantly when one individual changes her input data. This is a very strong privacy guarantee: anything significant about any individual that an adversary could learn from the algorithm's output, he could also learn were the individual not participating in the database at all-and this holds true no matter what auxiliary information the adversary may have. This definition guarantees privacy of an individual's sensitive data, while allowing the computation to respond when a large number of individuals change their data, as any useful computation must do.
Our Results
In this paper we initiate a systematic study of designing algorithms for combinatorial optimization problems under the constraint of differential privacy. Here is a short summary of some of the main contributions of our work.
• While the exponential mechanism of [25] is an easy way to obtain computationally inefficient private approximation algorithms for some problems, the approximation guarantees given by a direct application of this can be far from optimal (e.g., see our results on min-cut and weighted set cover). In these cases, we have to use different techniquesoften more sophisticated applications of the exponential mechanism-to get good (albeit computationally expensive) solutions.
• However, we want our algorithms to be computationally efficient and private at the same time: here we cannot use the exponential mechanism directly, and hence we develop new algorithmic ideas. We give private algorithms for a wide variety of search problems, where we must not only approximate the value of the solution, but also produce a solution that optimizes this value. See Table 1 for our results.
• For some problems, unfortunately, just outputting an explicit solution might leak private information. For example, if we output a vertex cover of some graph explicitly, any pair of vertices not output reveals that they do not share an edge -so any private explicit vertex cover algorithm must output n − 1 vertices. To overcome this hurdle, we instead privately output an implicit representation of a small vertex cover-we view vertex cover as a location problem, and output an orientation of the edges. Each edge can cover itself using the end point that it points to. The orientation is output privately, and the resulting vertex cover approximates the optimal vertex cover well. We deal with similar representational issues for other problems like set cover as well.
• We also show lower bounds on the approximation guarantees regardless of computational considerations. For example, for vertex cover, we show that any -differentially private algorithm must have an approximation guarantee of Ω(1/ ). We show that each of our lower bounds are tight: we give (computationally inefficient) algorithms with matching approximation guarantees.
• Our results have implications beyond privacy as well: Papadimitriou et al. [28] introduce the Combinatorial Public Project problem, a special case of submodular maximization, and show that the problem can be well approximated by either a truthful mechanism or an efficient algorithm, but not by both simultaneously. In contrast to this negative result, we show that under differential privacy (which can be interpreted as an approximate but robust alternative to truthfulness) we can achieve the same approximation factor as the best nontruthful algorithm, plus an additive logarithmic loss.
• Finally, we develop a private amplification lemma: we show how to take private algorithms that gives bounds in expectation and efficiently convert them (privately) into bounds with high probability. This answers an open question in the paper of Feldman et al. [15] . Table 1 summarizes the bounds we prove in this paper. For each problem, it reports (in the first column) the best known non-private approximation guarantees, (in the second column) our best efficient -differentially private algorithms, and in each (in the third column) case matching upper and lower bounds for inefficient -differentially private algorithms. For a few of the efficient algorithms (marked with a †) the guarantees are only for an approximate form of differential privacy, incorporating a failure probability δ, and scaling the effective value of up by ln(1/δ).
Related Work
Differential privacy is a relatively recent privacy definition (e.g., see [11, 8, 27, 6, 23, 15, 12] , and see [9] for an excellent survey), that tries to capture the intuition of individual privacy. Many algorithms in this framework have focused on measurement, statistics, and learning tasks applied to statistical data sets, rather than on processing and producing combinatorial objects. One exception to this is the Exponential Mechanism of [25] which allows the selection from a set of discrete alternatives.
Independently, Feldman et al. [15] also consider the problem of privately approximating k-medians for points in d . Their model differs slightly from ours, which makes the results largely incomparable: while our results for general metrics translated to d give smaller additive errors than theirs, we only output a kmedian approximation whereas they output coresets for the problem. Their lower bound argument for private coresets is similar to ours.
Prior work on Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) tells us that in fact the minimum cut in a graph can be computed in a distributed fashion in such a way that computations reveals nothing that cannot be learnt from the output of the computation. While this is a strong form of a privacy guarantee, it may be unsatisfying to an individual whose private data can be inferred from the privately computed output. Indeed, it is not hard to come up with instances where an attacker with some limited auxiliary information can infer the presence or absence of specific edges from local information about the minimum cut in the graph. By relaxing the whole input privacy requirement of SFE, differential privacy is able to provide unconditional per element privacy, which SFE need not provide if the output itself discloses properties of input. Feigenbaum et al. [14] extend the notion of SFE to NP hard problems for which efficient algorithms must output an approximation to the optimum, unless P=NP. They defined as functional privacy the constraint that two inputs with the same output value (e.g. the size of an optimal vertex cover) must produce the same value under the approximation algorithm. Under this constraint, Halevi et al. [17] show that approximating the value of vertex cover to within n 1−ξ is as hard as computing the value itself, for any constant ξ. These hardness results were extended to search problems by Beimel et al. [2] , where the constraint is relaxed to only equate those inputs whose sets of optimal solutions are identical. These results were extended and strengthened by Beimel et al. [3, 4] .
Nonetheless, Feigenbaum et al. [14] and others show a number of positive approximation results under versions of the functional privacy model. Halevi et al. [17] provide positive results in the function privacy setting when the algorithm is permitted to leak few bits (each equivalence class of input need not produce identical output, but must be one of at most 2 b possible outcomes). Indyk and Woodruff also give some positive results for the approximation of 2 distance and a nearest neighbor problem [20] . However, as functional privacy extends SFE, it does not protect sensitive data that can be inferred from the output.
Nevertheless, SFE provides an implementation of any function in a distributed setting such that nothing other than the output of the function is revealed. One can therefore run a differentially private algorithm is a distributed manner using SFE (see e.g. [10, 5] ), in the absence of a trusted curator.
Definitions
Differential privacy is a privacy definition for computations run against sensitive input data sets. Its requirement, informally, is that the computation behaves nearly identically on two input data sets that are nearly identical; the probability of any outcome must not increase by more than a small constant factor when the input set is altered by a single element. Formally, Definition 2.1. ( [11] ) We say a randomized computation M has -differential privacy if for any two input sets A and B with symmetric difference one, and for any set of outcomes S ⊆ Range(M ),
The definition has several appealing properties from a privacy perspective. One that is most important for us is that arbitrary sequences of differentially private computations are also differentially private, with an parameter equal to the sum of those comprising the sequence. This is true even when subsequent computations can depend on and incorporate the results of prior differentially private computations [10] , allowing repetition of differentially private steps to improve solutions.
Approximate Differential Privacy
One relaxation of differential privacy [10] allows a small additive term in the bound: Definition 2.2. We say a randomized computation M has δ-approximate -differential privacy if for any two input sets A and B with symmetric difference one, and for any set of outcomes S ⊆ Range(M ),
The flavor of guarantee is that although not all events have their probabilities preserved, the alteration is only for very low probability events, and is very unlikely to happen. The δ is best thought of as 1/poly(n) for a data set containing some subset of n candidate records. We note that there are stronger notions of approximate differential privacy (c.f. [24] ), but in our settings, they are equivalent upto poly(n) changes in δ. We therefore restrict ourselves to this definition here.
The Exponential Mechanism
One particularly general tool that we will often use is the exponential mechanism of [25] . This construction allows differentially private computation over arbitrary domains and ranges, parametrized by a query function q(A, r) mapping a pair of input data set A (a multiset over some domain) and candidate result r to a real valued "score". With q and a target privacy value , the mechanism selects an output with exponential bias in favor of high scoring outputs:
If the query function q has the property that any two adjacent data sets have score within ∆ of each other, for all possible outputs r, the mechanism provides 2 ∆-differential privacy. Typically, we would normalize q so that ∆ = 1. We will be using this mechanism almost exclusively over discrete ranges, where we can derive the following simple analogue of a theorem of [25] , that the probability of a highly suboptimal output is exponentially low:
Theorem 2.1. The exponential mechanism, when used to select an output r ∈ R gives 2 ∆-differential privacy, letting R OPT be the subset of R achieving q(A, r) = max r q(A, r), ensures that
The proof of the theorem is almost immediate: any outcome with score less than max r q(A, r) − ln(|R|/|R OPT |)/ − t/ will have normalized probability at most exp(−t)/|R|; each has weight at most exp(OPT − t)|R OPT |/|R|, but is normalized by at least |R OPT | exp(OPT) from the optimal outputs. As there are at most |R| such outputs their cumulative probability is at most exp(−t).
Private Min-Cut
Given a graph G = (V, E) the minimum cut problem is to find a cut (S, S c ) so as to minimize E(S, S c ). In absence of privacy constraints, this problem is efficiently solvable exactly. However, outputting an exact solution violates privacy, as we show in Section 3.1. Thus, we give an algorithm to output a cut within additive O(log n/ ) edges of optimal.
The algorithm has two stages: First, given a graph G, we add edges to the graph to raise the cost of the min cut to at least 4 ln n/ , in a differentially private manner. Second, we deploy the exponential mechanism over all cuts in the graph, using a theorem of Karger to show that for graphs with min cut at least 4 ln n/ the number of cuts within additive t of OPT increases no faster than exponentially with t. Although the exponential mechanism takes time exponential in n, we can construct a polynomial time version by considering only the polynomially many cuts within O(ln n/ ) of OPT. Below, let Cost(H, (S, S c )) denote the size E H (S, S c ) of the cut (S, S c ) in a graph H.
Algorithm 1
The Min-Cut Algorithm
) be arbitrary strictly increasing sets of edges on V .
Our result relies on a result of Karger about the number of near-minimum cuts in a graph [22] Lemma 3.1. ( [22] ) For any graph G with min cut C, there are at most n 2α cuts of size at most αC.
By enlarging the size of the min cut in G ∪ H i to at least 4 ln n/ , we ensure that the number of cuts of value OPT(G ∪ H i ) + t is bounded by n 2 exp( t/2). The downweighting of the exponential mechanism will be able to counteract this growth in number and ensure that we select a good cut. Proof. First, we argue that the selected index i satisfies 4 ln n/ < OPT(G ∪ H i ) < OPT(G) + 12 ln n/ with probability at least 1 − 1/n 2 . For OPT > 8 ln n/ , Equation 2.4 ensures that the probability of exceeding the optimal choice (H 0 ) by 4 ln n/ is at most 1 − 1/n 2 . Likewise, for OPT < 8 ln n/ , there is some optimal H i achieving min cut size 8 ln n/ , and the probability we end up farther away than 4 ln n/ is at most 1 − 1/n 2 . Assuming now that OPT(G ∪ H i ) > 4 ln n/ , Karger's lemma argues that the number c t of cuts in G ∪ H i of cost at most OPT(G ∪ H i ) + t is at most n 2 exp( t/2). As we are assured a cut of size OPT(G ∪ H i ) exists, each cut of size OPT(G ∪ H i ) + t will receive probability at most exp(− t). Put together, the probability of a cut exceeding
The sum telescopes to exp(− b/2)n 2 /(exp( /2) − 1), and the denominator is within a constant factor of the leading factor of (exp( )−1), for < 1. For b = 8 ln n/ , this probability becomes at most 1/n 2 .
Theorem 3.2. The algorithm above preserves 2 -differential privacy.
Note that the first instance of the exponential mechanism in our algorithm runs efficiently (since it is selecting from only n 2 objects), but the second instance does not. We now describe how to achieve (ε, δ)-differential privacy efficiently.
First recall that using Karger's algorithm we can efficiently (with high probability) generate all cuts of size at most kOPT for any constant k. Indeed it is shown in [22] that in a single run of his algorithm, any such cut is output with probability at least n −2k so that n 2k+1 runs of the algorithm will output all such cuts except with an exponentially small probability. Our efficient algorithm works as follows: in step 4 of Algorithm 1, instead of sampling amongst all possible cuts, we restrict attention to the set of cuts generated in n 7 runs of Karger's algorithm. We claim that the output distribution of this algorithm has statistical distance O(1/n 2 ) from that of Algorithm 1, which would imply that we get (ε, O(
Consider a hypothetical algorithm that generates the cut (S, S c ) as in Algorithm 1 but then outputs FAIL whenever this cut is not in the set of cuts generated by n 7 runs of Karger's. We first show that the probability that this algorithm outputs FAIL is O( 1 n 2 ). As shown above, OPT(G ∪ H i ) is at least 4 ln n/ε except with probability 1 n 2 . Conditioned on this, the cut chosen in Step 4 has cost at most 3OPT(G ∪ H i ) except with probability 1 n 2 . Since each such cut is in the sample except with exponentially small probability, the claim follows. Finally, note that this hypothetical algorithm can be naturally coupled with both the algorithms so that the outputs agree whenever the former doesn't output FAIL. This implies the claimed bound on the statistical distance. We remark that we have not attempted to optimize the running time here; both the running time and the value of δ can be improved by choosing a larger constant (instead of 8) in Step 3, at the cost of increasing the additive error by an additional constant. ,
Lower Bounds
We next show that this additive error is unavoidable for any differentially private algorithm. The lower bound is information-theoretic and thus applies also to computationally inefficient algorithms.
Theorem 3.3. Any -differentially private algorithm for min-cut must incur an expected additive Ω(ln n/ ) cost over OPT, for any ∈ (3 ln n/n, Proof. Consider a ln n/3 -regular graph G = (V, E) on n vertices such that the minimum cuts are exactly those that isolate a single vertex, and any other cut has size at least (ln n/2 ) (a simple probabilistic argument establishes the existence of such a G; in fact a randomly chosen ln n/3 -regular graph has this property with high probability).
Let M be an -differentially private algorithm for the min-cut. Given the graph G, M outputs a partition of V . Since there are n = |V | singleton cuts, there exists a vertex v such that the mechanism M run on G outputs the cut ({v}, V \ {v}) with probability at most 1/n, i.e.
Now consider the graph G = (V, E ), with the edges incident on v removed from G, i.e. E = E \ {e : v ∈ e}. Since M satisfies -differential privacy and E and E differ in at most ln n/3 edges,
Thus with probability (1
), M (G ) outputs a cut other than the minimum cut ({v}, V \ {v}). But all other cuts, even with these edges removed, cost at least (ln n/6 ). Since OPTis zero for G , the claim follows.
Private k-Median
We next consider a private version of the metric kmedian problem: There is a pre-specified set of points V and a metric on them,
There is a (private) set of demand points D ⊆ V . We wish to select a set of medians F ⊂ V with |F | = k to minimize the quantity cost(
be the diameter of the space. As we show in Section 4.1, any privacy-preserving algorithm for k-median must incur an additive loss of Ω(∆ · k ln(n/k)/ ), regardless of computational constraints. We observe that running the exponential mechanism to choose one of the n k subsets of medians gives an (computationally inefficient) additive guarantee.
Theorem 4.1. Using the exponential mechanism to pick a set of k facilities gives an O( n k poly(n))-time -differentially private algorithm that outputs a solution with expected cost OPT + O(k∆ log n/ ).
We next give a polynomial-time algorithm that gives a slightly worse approximation guarantee. Our algorithm is based on the local search algorithm of Arya et al. [1] . We start with an arbitrary set of k medians, and use the exponential mechanism to look for a (usually) improving swap. After running this local search for a suitable number of steps, we select a good solution from amongst the ones seen during the local search. The following result shows that if the current solution is far from optimal, then one can find improving swaps.
Corollary 4.1. For any set F ⊆ V with |F | = k, there exists some swap (x, y) such that
Select (x, y) ∈ F i × (V \ F i ) with probability proportional to exp(− × cost(F i − {x} + {y})).
5:
let F i+1 ← F i − {x} + {y}. 6: end for 7: Select j from {1, 2, . . . , T } with probability proportional to exp(− × cost(F j )).
Theorem 4.3. Setting T = 6k ln n and = /(2∆(T + 1)), the k-median algorithm provides -differential privacy and except with probability O(1/poly(n)) outputs a solution of cost at most 6OPT + O(∆k 2 log 2 n/ ).
Proof. We first prove the privacy. Since the cost function has sensitivity ∆, Step 4 of the algorithm preserves 2 ∆ differential privacy. Since Step 4 is run at most T times and privacy composes additively, outputting all of the T candidate solutions would give us (2 ∆T ) differential privacy. Picking out a good solution from the T candidates costs us another 2 ∆, leading to the stated privacy guarantee. We next show the approximation guarantee. By Corollary 4.1, so long as cost(F i ) ≥ 6OPT, there exists a swap (x, y) that reduces the cost by at least cost(F i )/6k. As there are only n 2 possible swaps, the exponential mechanism ensures through (2.4) that we are within additive 4 ln n/ with probability at least 1 − 1/n 2 . When cost(F i ) ≥ 6OPT + 24k ln n/ , with probability
This multiplicative decrease by (1 − 1/6k) applies for as long as cost(F i ) ≥ 6OPT + 24k ln n/ . Since cost(F 0 ) ≤ n∆, and n∆(1 − 1/6k) T ≤ ∆ ≤ 24k ln n/ , there must exist an i < T such that cost(F i ) ≤ 6OPT + 24k ln n/ , with probability at least (1 − T /n 2 ).
Finally, by applying the exponential mechanism again in the final stage, we select from the F i scoring within an additive 4 ln n/ of the optimal visited F i with probability at least 1 − 1/n 2 , again by (2.4). Plugging in the value of , we get the desired result. Increasing the constants in the additive term can drive the probability of failure to an arbitrarily small polynomial.
k-Median Lower Bound
Theorem 4.4. Any -differentially private algorithm for the k-median problem must incur cost OPT + Ω(∆ · k ln(n/k)/ ) on some inputs.
of nL points, with L = ln(n/k)/10 , and a distance function d((i, j), (i , j )) = ∆ whenever i = i and d((i, j), (i, j )) = 0. Let M be a differentially private algorithm that takes a subset D ⊆ V and outputs a set of k locations, for some k < n 4 . Given the nature of the metric space, we assume that Now to prove the claim: define φ :
Now changing A to A := A \ {i} + {i } for some random i requires altering at most 2L elements in D A , which by the differential privacy guarantee should change the probability of the output by at most e 2 L = (n/k) 1/5 . Hence
But the expression on the left is just k/n, since there at at most k medians. Hence φ ≤ (k/n) 4/5 ≤ 1/2, which proves the claim.
Corollary 4.2. Any 1-differentially private algorithm for uniform facility location that outputs the set of chosen facilities must have approximation ratio Ω( √ n).
Proof. We consider instances defined on the uniform metric on n points, with d(u, v) = 1 for all u, v, and
. Consider a 1-differentially private mechanism M when run on a randomly chosen subset A of size k = √ n. Since OPT is kf = 1 for these instances, any o( √ n)-approximation must select at least k 2 locations from A in expectation. By an argument analogous to the above theorem, it follows that any differentially private M must output n/20 of the locations in expectation. This leads to a facility opening cost of Ω( √ n).
Euclidean Setting
Feldman et al. [15] study private coresets for the k-median problem when the input points are in d . For P points in the unit ball in d , they give coresets with (1 + ε) multiplicative error, and additive errors about O(k 2 d 2 log 2 P ) and O(16kd) 2d d 3/2 log P log dk) respectively for their inefficient and efficient algorithms. Since Euclidean k-median has a PTAS, this leads to k-median approximations with the same guarantees. We can translate our results to their setting by looking at a (1/P )-net of the unit ball as the candidate set of n-points, of which some may appear. This would lead to an inefficient algorithm with additive error O(kd log P ), and an efficient algorithm with additive error O(k 2 d 2 log 2 P ). The latter has a multiplicative error of 6 and hence our efficient algorithms are incomparable. Note that coresets are more general objects than just the k-median solution.
Vertex Cover
We now turn to the problem of (unweighted) vertex cover, where we want to pick a set S of vertices of minimal size so that every edge in the graph is incident to at least one vertex in S. In the privacy-preserving version of the problem, the private information we wish to conceal is the presence of absence of each edge.
Approximating the Vertex Cover Size. As mentioned earlier, even approximating the vertex cover size was shown to be polynomially inapproximable under the constraint of functional privacy [17, 2] . On the other hand, it is easy to approximate the size of the optimal vertex cover under differential privacy: twice the size of a maximum matching is a 2-approximation to the optimal vertex cover, and this value only changes by at most two with the presence or absence of a single edge. Hence, this value plus Laplace(2/ ) noise provides -differential privacy [11] . (Here it is important that we use maximum rather than just maximal matchings, since the size of the latter is not uniquely determined by the graph, and the presence or absence of an edge may dramatically alter the size of the solution.) Interestingly enough, for weighted vertex cover with maximum weight w max (which we study in Section 5.2), we have to add in Lap(w max / ) noise to privately estimate the weight of the optimal solution, which can be much larger than OPT itself. The mechanism in Section 5.2 avoids this barrier by outputting an implicit representation of the vertex cover, and hence gives us a O(1/ ) multiplicative approximation with -differential privacy.
The Vertex Cover Search Problem. If we want to find a vertex cover (and not just estimate its size), how can we do this privately? In covering problems, the (private) data imposes hard constraints on the a solution, making them quite different from, say, mincut. Indeed, while the private data only influences the objective function in the min-cut problem, the data determines the constraints defining feasible solutions in the case of the vertex cover problem. This hard covering constraint make it impossible to actually output a small vertex cover privately: as noted in the introduction, any differentially private algorithm for vertex cover that outputs an explicit vertex cover (a subset of the n vertices) must output a cover of size at least n − 1 with probability 1 on any input, an essentially useless result. In order to address this challenge, we require our algorithms to output an implicit representation of a cover: we privately output an orientation of the edges. Now for each edge, if we pick the endpoint that it points to, we clearly get a vertex cover. Our analysis ensures that this vertex cover has size not much larger than the size of the optimal vertex cover for the instance. Hence, such an orientation may be viewed as a privacy-preserving set of instructions that allows for the construction of a good vertex cover in a distributed manner: in the case of the undercover agents mentioned in the introduction, the complete set of active dropoff sites (nodes) is not revealed to the agents, but an orientation on the edges tells each agent which dropoff site to use, if she is indeed an active agent. Our algorithms in fact output a permutation of all the vertices of the graph. Each edge can be considered oriented towards the endpoint appearing earlier in the permutation. Our lower bounds apply to the more general setting where we are allowed to output any orientation (and hence are stronger).
The Algorithm for Unweighted Vertex
Cover Our (randomized) algorithm will output a permutation, and the vertex cover will be defined by picking, for each edge, whichever of its endpoints appears first in the permutation. We show that this vertex cover will be (2+O(1/ ))-approximate and -differentially private. Our algorithm is based on a simple (non-private) 2-approximation to vertex cover [29] that repeatedly selects an uncovered edge uniformly at random, and includes a random endpoint of the edge. We can view the process, equivalently, as selecting a vertex at random with probability proportional to its uncovered degree. We will take this formulation and mix in a uniform distribution over the vertices, using a weight that will grow as the number of remaining vertices decreases.
Let us start from G 1 = G, and let G i be the graph with n − i + 1 vertices remaining. We will write d v (G) for the degree of vertex v in graph G. The algorithm ALG in step i chooses from the n − i + 1 vertices of G i with probability proportional to d v (G i ) + w i , for an appropriate sequence w i . Taking w i = (4/ )×(n/(n− i + 1))
1/2 provides -differential privacy and a (2 + 16/ ) approximation factor, the proof of which will follow from the forthcoming Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2.
As stated the algorithm outputs a sequence of vertices, one per iteration. As remarked above, this permutation defines a vertex cover by picking the earlier occurring end point of each edge.
Algorithm 3 Unweighted Vertex Cover
pick a vertex v ∈ V i with probability proportional to Proof. For any two sets of edges A and B, and any permutation π, let d i be the degree of the i th vertex in the permutation π and let m i be the remaining edges, both ignoring edges incident to the first i − 1 vertices in π.
.
When A and B differ in exactly one edge,
for all i except the first endpoint incident to the edge in the difference. Until this term m i (A) and m i (B) differ by exactly one, and after this term m i (A) = m i (B). The number of nodes is always equal, of course. Letting j be the index in π of the first endpoint of the edge in difference, we can cancel all terms after j and rewrite
An edge may have arrived in A, in which case m i (A) = m i (B) + 1 for all i ≤ j, and each term in the product is at most one; moreover, d j (A) = d j (B) + 1, and hence the leading term is at most 1+1/w j < exp(1/w 1 ), which is bounded by exp( /2). Alternately, an edge may have departed from A, in which case the lead term is no more than one, but each term in the product exceeds one and their product must now be bounded. Note that m i (A) + 1 = m i (B) for all relevant i, and that by ignoring all other edges we only make the product larger. Simplifying, and using 1 + x ≤ exp(x), we see
The w i are chosen so that
Proof. Let OP T (G) denote an arbitrary optimal solution to the vertex cover problem on G. The proof is inductive, on the size n of G. For G with |OP T (G)| > n/2, the theorem holds. For G with |OP T (G)| ≤ n/2, the expected cost of the algorithm is the probability that the chosen vertex v is incident to an edge, plus the expected cost of ALG(G \ v).
We will bound the second term using the inductive hypothesis. To bound the first term, the probability that v is chosen incident to an edge is at most (2mw n + 2m)/(nw n + 2m), as there are at most 2m vertices incident to edges. On the other hand, the probability that we pick a vertex in OP T (G) is at least (|OP T (G)|w n + m)/(nw n + 2m). Since |OP T (G)| is non-negative, we conclude that
, and using the inductive hypothesis, we get
The probability that v is from an optimal vertex cover is at least (|OP T (G)|w i + m)/(nw i + 2m), as mentioned above, and (using
Simplification yields the claimed results, and instantiating w i completes the proof.
Hallucinated Edges. Here is a slightly different way to implement the intuition behind the above algorithm: imagine adding O(1/ ) "hallucinated" edges to each vertex (the other endpoints of these hallucinated edges being fresh "hallucinated" vertices), and then sampling vertices without replacement proportional to these altered degrees. However, once (say) n/2 vertices have been sampled, output the remaining vertices in random order. This view will be useful to keep in mind for the weighted vertex cover proof. (A formal analysis of this algorithm appears in the full version.)
Weighted Vertex Cover
In the weighted vertex cover problem, each vertex V is assigned a weight w(v), and the cost of any vertex cover is the sum of the weights of the participating vertices. One can extend the unweighted 2-approximation that draws vertices at random with probability proportional to their uncovered degree to a weighted 2-approximation by drawing vertices with probability proportional to their uncovered degree divided by their weight. The differentially private analog of this algorithm essentially draws vertices with probability proportional to 1/ plus their degree, all divided by the weight of the vertex; the algorithm we present here is based on this idea.
Define the score of a vertex to be s(v) = 1/w(v). Our algorithm involves hallucinating edges: to each vertex, we add in 1/ hallucinated edges, the other endpoints of which are imaginary vertices, whose weight is considered to be ∞ (and hence has zero score). The score of an edge e = (u, v) is defined to be s(e) = s(u)+s(v); hence the score of a fake edge f incident on u is s(f ) = s(u), since its other (imaginary) endpoint has infinite weight and zero score. We will draw edges with probability proportional to their score, and then select an endpoint to output with probability proportional to its score. In addition, once a substantial number of vertices of at least a particular weight have been output, we will output the rest of those vertices.
Assume the minimum vertex weight is 1 and the maximum is 2
J . For simplicity, we round the weight of each vertex up to a power of 2, at a potential loss of a factor of two in the approximation. Define the j th weight class V j to be the set of vertices of weight 2 j . In addition, we will assume that |V j | = |V j+1 | for all weight classes. In order to achieve this, we hallucinate additional fake vertices. We will never actually output a hallucinated vertex. Let N j denote |V j |.
Algorithm 4
pick an uncovered (real or hallucinated) edge e = (u, v) with probability proportional to s(e).
3:
output endpoint u ∈ e with probability proportional to s(u).
4:
while there exists some weight class V j such that the number of nodes of class j or higher that we've output is at least
pick the smallest such value of j 6:
output ("dump") all remaining vertices in V j in random order.
7:
end while 8: end while
We imagine the i th iteration of the outer loop of the algorithm as happening at time i; note that one vertex is output in Step 3, whereas multiple vertices might be output in Step 6. Let n i be the sum of the scores of all real vertices not output before time i, and m i be the sum of the scores of all real edges not covered before time i.
Privacy Analysis
Theorem 5.3. The weighted vertex cover algorithm preserves O( ) differential privacy.
Proof. Consider some potential output π of the private vertex cover algorithm, and two weighted vertex cover instances A and B that are identical except for one edge e = (p, q). Let p appear before q in the permutation π; since the vertex sets are the same, if the outputs of both A and B are π, then p will be output at the same time t in both executions. Let v t be the vertex output in Step 3 at time t in such an execution; note that either p = v t , or p is output in Step 6 after v t is output.
The probability that (conditioned on the history) a surviving vertex v is output in Step 3 of the algorithm at time i is:
Since we compare the runs of the algorithm on A and B which differ only in edge e, these will be identical after time t when e is covered, and hence
Note that if the extra edge e ∈ A \ B then For the first partial sum, for some j ≤ j * , let
has not yet been covered, we must have output fewer than N j * /2 vertices from levels j * or higher, and hence at least N j * /2 remaining vertices from V j * contribute to n i0 .
In each time step in T j , at least one vertex of score 2 −j is output, so we have that n i ≥ 2
Defining θ = 2 −j * +j · N j * /2, the expression above simplifies to
Now using the assumption on the size of the weight classes, we have N j ≤ N j * =⇒ N j /θ ≤ 2 j * −j+1 , and hence i∈Tj 1 e ni ≤ (j * −j +2)2 j , for any j ≤ j * . Finally,
We now consider the other partial sum j>j * i∈Tj 1 e ni . For any such value of i, we know that n i ≥ 2
Moreover, there are at most N j * /2 times when we output a vertex from some weight class j ≥ j * before we output all of V j * ; hence there are at most N j * /2 terms in the sum, each of which is at most
, giving a bound of 2 j * on the second partial sum. Putting the two together, we get that
using the fact that s(e) ≤ 2 · 2 −j * , since the lighter endpoint of e had weight 2 j * .
Utility Analysis Call a vertex v interesting
if it is incident on a real uncovered edge when it is picked. Consider the weight class V j : let I 1 j ⊆ V j be the set of interesting vertices output due to Steps 3, and I 2 j ⊆ V j be the set of interesting vertices of class j output due to Step 6. The cost incurred by the algorithm is
OPT
Proof. Every interesting vertex that our algorithm picks in Steps 3 has at least one real edge incident on it, and at most 1 ε hallucinated edges. Conditioned on selecting an interesting vertex v, the selection is due to a real edge with probability at least 1/(1 + 1 ε ). One can show that the (non-private) algorithm A that selects only real edges is a 2-approximation [29] . On the other hand each vertex in I 1 j can be coupled to a step of A with probability ε/(1 + ε). Since we rounded up the costs by at most a factor of two, the claim follows.
Proof. Let t j denote the time that class j is dumped. Recall that by (5.2.1), we pick a surviving vertex v with probability ∝ (d(v) + 1 ε ) · s(v) at each step. This expression summed over all uninteresting vertices is ∪ j ≥j V j is at most (1/ε) j ≥j 2 −j N j ≤ 2 −j+1 N j /ε. On the other hand, at each step before time t j , all the interesting vertices in I 2 j are available and the same expression summed over them is at least 2 −j |I 2 j |/ . Thus for any t ≤ t j , conditioned on outputting a vertex v t ∈ ∪ j ≥j V j in Step 3, the probability that it is interesting is at least
. Now since we output N j /2 vertices from ∪ j ≥j V j in Step 3 before time t j , we conclude that
. Taking expectations completes the proof.
We can now compute the total cost of all the interesting vertices dumped in Steps 6 of the algorithm.
Finally, combining this calculation with Lemma 5.1, we conclude that our algorithm gives an O( 1 ε ) approximation to the weighted vertex cover problem.
Vertex Cover Lower Bounds
Theorem 5.4. Any algorithm for the vertex cover problem that prescribes edge-orientations withdifferential privacy must have an Ω(1/ ) approximation guarantee, for any ∈ (
Proof. Let V = {1, 2, . . . , 1 2 }, and let M be andifferentially private algorithm that takes as input a private set E of edges, and outputs an orientation M E : V × V → V , with M E (u, v) ∈ {u, v} indicating to the edge which endpoint to use. Picking two distinct vertices u = v uniformly at random (and equating (u, v) with (v, u)), we have by symmetry:
Let u = (V, {u} × (V \ {u})) be the star graph rooted at u. Since u and ∅ differ in at most 1 2 − 1 < 1 edges and M satisfies -differential privacy, we conclude that
Thus the expected cost of M when input a uniformly random u is at least 1 2e × 1 2 , while OPT( u ) is 1. We can repeat this pattern arbitrarily, picking a random star from each group of 1/ vertices; this results in graphs with arbitrarily large vertex covers where M incurs cost 1/ times the cost.
Set Cover
We now turn our attention to private approximations for the Set Cover Problem; here the set system (U, S) is public, but the actual set of elements to be covered R ⊆ U is the private information. As for vertex cover, we cannot explicitly output a set cover that is good and private at the same time. Hence, we again output a permutation over all the sets in the set system; this implicitly defines a set cover for R by picking, for each element R, the first set in this permutation that contains it. Our algorithms for set cover give the slightly weaker ( , δ)-privacy guarantees.
Unweighted Set Cover
We are given a set system (U, S) and must cover a private subset R ⊂ U . Let the cardinality of the set system be |S| = m, and let |U | = n. We first observe a computationally inefficient algorithm.
Theorem 6.1. The exponential mechanism, when used to pick a permutation of sets, runs in time O(m!poly(n)) and gives an O(log(em/OPT)/ )-approximation.
Proof. A random permutation, with probability at least m OPT −1 has all the sets in OPT before any set in OPT c .
Thus the additive error is O(log m OPT / ).
The rest of the section gives a computationally efficient algorithm with slightly worse guarantees: this is a modified version of the greedy algorithm, using the exponential mechanism to bias towards picking large sets.
Algorithm 5 Unweighted Set Cover
1: Input: Set system (U, S), private R ⊂ U of elements to cover, ,δ. pick a set S from S i with probability proportional to exp( |S ∩ R i |).
5:
output set S.
6:
R i+1 ← R i \ S, S i+1 ← S i − {S}. 7: end for 6.1.1 Utility Analysis At the beginning of iteration i, say there are m i = m − i + 1 remaining sets and n i = |R i | remaining elements, and define L i = max S∈S |S ∩ R i |, the largest number of uncovered elements covered by any set in S. By a standard argument, any algorithm that always picks sets of size L i /2 is an O(ln n) approximation algorithm. Theorem 6.2. The above algorithm achieves an expected approximation ratio of O(ln n + ln m ) = O(ln n + ln m ln(e/δ) ).
Proof. As there is at least one set containing L i elements, our use of the exponential mechanism to select sets combined with Equation 2.4 ensures that the probability we select a set covering fewer than L i − 3 ln m/ elements is at most 1/m 2 . While L i > 6 ln m/ , with probability at least (1 − 1/m) we always select sets that cover at least L i /2 elements, and can therefore use no more than O(OPT ln n) sets. Once L i drops below this bound, we observe that the number of remaining elements |R i | is at most OPT · L i . Any permutation therefore costs at most an additional O(OPT ln m/ ).
Privacy
Theorem 6.3. The unweighted set cover algorithm preserves ( , δ) differential privacy for any ∈ (0, 1), and δ < 1/e.
Proof. Let A and B be two set cover instances that differ in some element I. Say that S I is the collection of sets containing I. Fix an output permutation π, and write s i,j (A) to denote the size of set S j after the first i − 1 sets in π have been added to the cover.
where t is such that S πt is the first set containing I to fall in the permutation π. After t, the remaining elements in A and B are identical, and all subsequent terms cancel. Moreover, except for the t th term, the numerators of both the top and bottom expression cancel, since all the relevant set sizes are equal. If A contains I and B does not the first term is exp( ) and the each term in the product is at most 1. Now suppose that B contains I and A does not . In this case, the first term is exp(− ) < 1. Moreover, in instance B, every set in S I is larger by 1 than in A, and all others remain the same size. Therefore, we have:
where p i (A) is the probability that a set containing I is chosen at step i of the algorithm running on instance A, conditioned on picking the sets S π1 , . . . , S πi−1 in the previous steps. For an instance A and an element I ∈ A, we say that an output σ is q-bad if i p i (A)1(I uncovered at step i) (strictly) exceeds q, where p i (A) is as defined above. We call a permutation q-good otherwise. We first consider the case when the output π is (ln δ −1 )-good. By the definition of t, we have
Continuing the analysis from above,
Thus, for any (ln δ −1 )-good output π, we have
We can then invoke the following lemma, proved in appendix A Lemma 6.1. For any set system (U, S), any instance A and any I ∈ A, the probability that the output π of the algorithm above is q-bad is bounded by exp(−q).
Thus for any set P of outcomes, we have
Corollary 6.1. For < 1 and δ = 1/poly(n), there is an O( ln n ln m )-approximation algorithm for the unweighted set cover problem preserving ( , δ)-differential privacy.
Weighted Set Cover
We are given a set system (U, S) and a cost function C : S → R. We must cover a private subset R ⊂ U . W.l.o.g., let min S∈S C(S) = 1, and denote max S∈S C(S) = W . Let the cardinality of the set system be |S| = m, and let |U | = n.
Algorithm 6 Weighted Set Cover
pick a set S from S i with probability proportional to exp |S ∩ R i | − r i · C(S) or halve with probability proportional to exp(− T ) 4: if halve then 5:
output set S 8:
end if 10: end while 11: output all remaining sets in S i in random order Let us first analyze the utility of the algorithm. If R = ∅, the algorithm has cost zero and there is nothing to prove. So we can assume that OPT ≥ 1. We first show that (whp) r i R i /OPT. OPT , then we argue that with high probability, the algorithm will not output halve and thus not halve r i . Since all remaining elements R i can be covered at cost at most OPT, there must exist a set S such that
Hence u i (S) := |S ∩ R i | − r i · C(S) ≥ 0 in this case, and the algorithm will output S with probability at least proportional to 1, whereas it outputs halve with probability proportional to exp(− T ). Thus, Pr[ algorithm returns halve ] < exp(− T ) = 1/ poly(m log nW ). Since there are m sets in total, and r ranges from n to 1/W , there are at most m + O(log nW ) iterations, and the proof follows by a union bound.
Let us define a score function u i (S) := |S ∩ R i | − r i · C(S), and u i (halve) := −T : note that in Step 4 of our algorithm, we output either halve or a set S, with probabilities proportional to exp( u i (·)). The following lemma states that with high probability, none of the sets output by our algorithm have very low scores (since we are much more likely to output halve than a low-scoring set). Proof. There are at most |S i | ≤ m sets S with score u i (S) ≤ −2T , and so one is output with probability at most proportional to m exp(−2T ). We will denote this bad event by B. On the other hand, halve is output with probability proportional to exp (−T ) We now analyze the cost incurred by the algorithm in each stage. Let us divide the algorithm's execution into stages: stage j consists of all iterations i where
. Call a set S i nteresting if it is incident on an uncovered element when it is picked. Let I j be the set of interesting sets selected in stage j, and C(I j ) be the total cost incurred on these sets.
Lemma 6.4. Consider stages 1, . . . , j of the algorithm. Except with probability 1/ poly(m), we can bound the cost of the interesting sets in stage 1, . . . , j by:
Proof. By Lemma 6.3 all the output sets have u i (S i ) ≥ −2T whp. Rewriting, each S i selected in a round j ≤ j satisfies
where the second inequality is whp, and uses Lemma 6.2. Now summing over all rounds j ≤ j, we get j ≤j
Consider the inner sum for any particular value of j : let the first iteration in stage j be iteration i 0 -naturally R i ⊆ R i0 for any iteration i in this stage. Now, since S i ∩ R i ⊆ R i0 and S i ∩ R i is disjoint from S i ∩ R i , the sum over |S i ∩ R i | is at most |R i0 |, which is at most n 2 j −1 by definition of stage j . Moreover, since we are only concerned with bounding the cost of interesting sets, each |S i ∩ R i | ≥ 1, and so |S i ∩ R i | + 2T ≤ |S i ∩ R i |(1 + 2T ). Putting this together, (6.5) implies j ≤j
which proves the lemma.
Theorem 6.4. (Utility)
The weighted set cover algorithm incurs a cost of O(T log n OPT) except with probability 1/ poly(m).
Proof. Since the number of uncovered elements halves in each stage by definition, there are at most 1 + log n stages, which by Lemma 6.4 incur a total cost of at most O(log n OPT · (1 + 2T ) ). The sets that remain and are output at the very end of the algorithm incur cost at most W for each remaining uncovered element; since r i < 1/W at the end, Lemma 6.2 implies that |R i | < 2OPT/W (whp), giving an additional cost of at most 2 OPT.
We can adapt the above argument to bound the expected cost by O(T log n OPT). (Proof in the full version.) Theorem 6.5. (Privacy) For any δ > 0, the weighted set cover algorithm preserves ( , δ) differential privacy.
Proof. We imagine that the algorithm outputs a set named "HALVE" when Step 4 of the algorithm returns halve, and show that even this output is privacy preserving. Let A and B be two set cover instances that differ in some element I. Say that S I is the collection of sets containing I. Fix an output π, and write u i,j (A) to denote the score of π j (recall this may be halve) after the first i − 1 sets in π have been selected.
where t is such that S πt is the first set containing I to fall in the permutation π. After t, the remaining elements in A and B are identical, and all subsequent terms cancel. Moreover, except for the t th term, the numerators of both the top and bottom expression cancel, since all the relevant set sizes are equal. If A contains I and B does not the first term is exp( ) and the each term in the product is at most 1. Since ≤ , we conclude that in this case, for any set P of outputs,
Now suppose that B contains I and A does not . In this case, the first term is exp(− ) < 1. Moreover, in instance B, every set in S I is larger by 1 than in A, and all others remain the same size. Therefore, we have:
Finally, as in the proof of Theorem 6.3, we can use lemma 6.1 to complete the proof.
6.3 Removing the Dependence on W We can remove the dependence of the algorithm on W with a simple idea. For an instance I = (U, S), let S j = {S ∈ S | C(S) ∈ (n j , n j+1 ] }. Let U j be the set of elements such that the cheapest set containing them is in S j . Suppose that for each j and each S ∈ S j , we remove all elements that can be covered by a set of cost at most n j−1 , and hence define S to be S ∩ (U j ∪ U j−1 ). This would change the cost of the optimal solution only by a factor of 2, since if we were earlier using S in the optimal solution, we can pick S and at most n sets of cost at most n j−1 to cover the elements covered by S \ S . Call this instance I = (U, S ). Now we partition this instance into two instances I 1 and I 2 , where I 1 = (∪ j even U j , S ), and where
Since we have just partitioned the universe, the optimal solution on both these instances costs at most 2 OPT(I). But both these instances I 1 , I 2 are themselves collections of disjoint instances, with each of these instances having w max /w min ≤ n 2 ; this immediately allows us to remove the dependence on W . Note that this transformation is based only on the set system (U, S), and not on the private subset R. Theorem 6.6. For any ∈ (0, 1), δ = 1/ poly(n), there is an O(logn(log m + log log n)/ )-approximation for the weighted set cover problem that preserves ( , δ)-differential privacy.
Lower bounds
Theorem 6.7. Any -differentially private algorithm that maps elements to sets must have approximation factor Ω(log m/ ), for a set cover instance with m sets and ((log m)/ ) O(1) elements, for any ∈ (2 log m/m 1 20 , 1).
Proof. We consider a set system with |U | = N and S a uniformly random selection of m size-k subsets of U . We will consider problem instances S i consisting of one of these m subsets, so OPT(S i ) = 1. Let M be an -differentially private algorithm that on input T ⊆ U , outputs an assignment f mapping each element in U to some set in S that covers it. The number of possible assignments is at most m N . The cost on input T under an assignment f is the cardinality of the set f (T ) = ∪ e∈T f (e).
We say assignment f is good for a subset T ⊆ U if its cost |f (T )| is at most l = k 2 . We first show that any fixed assignment f : U → [m], such that |f −1 (j)| ≤ k for all j, is unlikely to be good for a randomly picked size-k subset T of U . The number of ways to choose l sets from among those with non-empty f −1 (·) is at most N l . Thus the probability that f is good for a random size-k subset is at most Let m = 2 2 k . The probability that f is good for at least t of our m randomly picked sets is bounded by
Thus, with probability at most 2 −N k log k/8 , a fixed assignment is good for more than N of m randomly chosen size-k sets. Taking a union bound over m N = 2 2 kN possible assignments, the probability that any feasible assignment f is good for more than N sets is at most 2 −N k log k/16 . Thus there exists a selection of size-k sets S 1 , . . . , S m such that no feasible assignment f is good for more than N of the S i 's. Let p M (∅) (S i ) be the probability that an assignment drawn from the distribution defined by running M on the the empty set as input is good for S i . Since any fixed assignment is good for at most N of the m sets, the average value of p M (∅) is at most N/m. Thus there exists a set, say
Thus with probability at least half, the assignment M picks on S 1 is not good for S 1 . Since OPT(S 1 ) = 1, the expected approximation ratio of M is at least l/2 = log m 4 . Additionally, one can take s distinct instances of the above problem, leading to a new instance on s · N elements and s · m sets. OPT is now s, while it is easy to check that any private algorithm must cost Ω(s · l) in expectation. Thus the lower bound in fact rules out additive approximations.
It is natural to ask if this lower bound is tight for the weighted case. Unlike the unweighted case, a direct application of the exponential mechanism does not lead to a good approximation guarantee. In the full version of the paper, we give an (inefficient) differentially private algorithm for weighted set cover matching the lower bound above.
Facility Location
Consider the metric facility location problem: we are given a metric space (V, d), a facility cost f and a (private) set of demand points D ⊆ V . We want to select a set of facilities F ⊆ V to minimize v∈D d(v, F )+f ·|F |. (Note that we assume "uniform" facility costs here instead of different costs f i for different i ∈ V .) Assume that distances are at least 1, and let ∆ = max u,v d(u, v) denote the diameter of the space.
We use the result of Fakcharoenphol et al. [13] that any metric space on n points can be approximated by a distribution over dominating trees with expected stretch O(log n); moreover all the trees in the support of the distribution are rooted 2-HSTs-they have L = O(log ∆) levels, with the leaves (at level 0) being exactly = V , the internal nodes being all Steiner nodes, the root having level L, and all edges between levels (i + 1) and i having length 2
i . Given such a tree T and node v at level i, let T v denote the (vertices in) the subtree rooted at v.
By Corollary 4.2, it is clear that we cannot output the actual set of facilities, so we will instead output instructions in the form of an HST T = (V T , E T ) and a set of facilities F ⊆ V T : each demand x ∈ D then gets assigned to its ancestor facility at the lowest level in the tree. (We guarantee that the root is always in F , hence this is well-defined.) Now we are charged for the connection costs, and for the facilities that have at least one demand assigned to them.
Algorithm 7 The Facility Location Algorithm
Pick a random distance-preserving FRT tree T ; recall this is a 2-HST with L = O(log ∆) levels.
for all vertices v at level i do 6:
end for 9: end for 10: output (T, F ): each demand x ∈ D is assigned to the ancestor facility at lowest level in T .
Theorem 7.1. The above algorithm preservesdifferential privacy and outputs a solution of cost OPT · O(log n log ∆) · log ∆ log n log
For the privacy analysis, instead of outputting the set F we could imagine outputting the tree T and all the counts N v ; this information clearly determines F . Note that the tree is completely oblivious of the demand set. Since adding or removing any particular demand vertex can only change L counts, and the noise added in Step 6 gives us ε/L-differential privacy, the fact that differential privacy composes linearly gives us the privacy claim.
For the utility analysis, consider the "noiseless" version of the algorithm which opens a facility at v when N v · 2 i ≥ f . It can be shown that this ideal algorithm incurs cost at most f +O(log n log ∆)·OPT (see, e.g., [19, Theorem 3] ). We now have two additional sources of error due to the noise:
• Consider the case when
, which increases the connection cost of some demands in D. However, the noise is symmetric, and so we overshoot the mark with probability at most 1/2-and when this happens the 2-HST property ensures that the connection cost for any demand x increases by at most a factor of 2. Since there are at most L = O(log ∆) levels, the expected connection cost increases by at most a factor of L.
• Consider the other case when N v · 2 i < f ≤ N v · 2 i , which increases the facility cost. Note that if N v · 2 i ≥ f /2, then opening a facility at v can be charged again in the same way as for the noiseless algorithm (up to a factor of 2). Hence suppose
i ), and hence we need to consider the probability p i of the event that
log L 2 n ε , the above probability p i is at most 1/Ln, and hence the expected cost of opening up spurious facilities at nodes with such values of i is at most (1/Ln) · Ln · f = f . (There are L levels, and at most n nodes at each level.)
For the values of i which are higher; i.e., for which
ε , we pay for this facility only if there is a demand x ∈ D in the subtree below v that actually uses this facility. Hence this demand x must have used a facility above v in the noiseless solution, and we can charge the cost f of opening this facility to length of the edge 2 i+1 above v. Thus the total cost of spurious facilities we pay for is the cost of the noiseless solution times a factor L log L 2 n ε . Thus the expected cost of the solution is at most
Recently Papadimitriou et al. [28] introduced the Combinatorial Public Projects Problem (CPP Problem) and showed that there is a succinctly representable version of the problem for which, although there exists a constant factor approximation algorithm, no efficient truthful algorithm can guarantee an approximation ratio better than m 1 2 − , unless N P ⊆ BP P . Here we adapt our set cover algorithm to give a privacy preserving approximation to the CPP problem within logarithmic (additive) factors.
In the CPP problem, we have n agents and m resources publicly known. Each agent submits a private non-decreasing and submodular valuation function f i over subsets of resources, and our goal is to select a size-k subset S of the resources to maximize n i=1 f i (S). We assume that we have oracle access to the functions f i . Note that since each f i is submodular, so is n i=1 f i (S), and our goal is to produce a algorithm for submodular maximization that preserves the privacy of the individual agent valuation functions. Without loss of generality, we will scale the valuation functions such that they take maximum value 1: max i,S f i (S) = 1.
Once again, we have an easy computationally inefficient algorithm. We next give a computationally efficient algorithm with slightly worse guarantees. We adapt our unweighted set cover algorithm, simply selecting k items greedily:
Input: A set of M of m resources, private functions f 1 , . . . , f n , a number of resources k, , δ.
pick a resource r from M i with probability proportional to exp( (F (S i + {r}) − F (S i ))).
5:
let M i+1 ← M i − {r}, S i+1 ← S i + {r}. 6: end for 7: Output S k+1 .
Utility Analysis
Theorem 8.2. Except with probability O(1/poly(n)), the algorithm for the CPP problem returns a solution with quality at least (1 − 1/e)OPT − O(k log m/ ).
Proof. Since F is submodular and there exists a set S * with |S| = k and F (S) = OPT, there always exists a resource r such that F (S i + {r}) − F (S i ) ≥ (OPT − F (S i ))/k. If we always selected the optimizing resource, the distance to OPT would decrease by a factor of 1 − 1/k each round, and we would achieve an approximation factor of 1 − 1/e. Instead, we use the exponential mechanism which, by (2.4), selects a resource within 4 ln m/ of the optimizing resource with probability at least 1 − 1/m 3 . With probability at least 1−k/m 3 each of the k selections decreases OPT−F (S i ) by a factor of (1−1/k), while increasing it by at most an additive 4 ln m/ , giving (1 − 1/e)OPT + O(k ln m/ ).
Privacy Analysis
Theorem 8.3. For any δ ≤ 1/2, the CPP problem algorithm preserves ( (e − 1) ln(e/δ), δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. Let A and B be two CP P instances that differ in a single agent I with utility function f I . We show that the output set of resources, even revealing the order in which the resources were chosen, is privacy preserving. Fix some ordered set of k resources, π 1 , . . . , π k write S i = i−1 j=1 {π(j)} to denote the first i − 1 elements, and write s i,j (A) = F A (S i + {j}) − F A (S i ) to denote the marginal utility of item j at time i in instance A. Define s i,j (B) similarly for instance B. We consider the relative probability of our mechanism outputting ordering π when given inputs A and B: ( · s i,j (B)) ) ,
where the sum over j is over all remaining unselected resources. We can separate this into two products
If A contains agent I but B does not, the second product is at most 1, and the first is at most exp( k i=1 (F I (S i ) − F I (S i−1 ))) ≤ exp( ). If B contains agent I, and A does not, the first product is at most 1, and in the remainder of the proof, we focus on this case. We will write β i,j = s i,j (B) − s i,j (A) to be the additional marginal utility of item j at time i in instance B over instance A, due to agent I. Thus
where β i is the marginal utility actually achieved at time i by agent I, and the expectation is taken over the probability distribution over resources selected at time i in instance A. For all x ≤ 1, e x ≤ 1 + (e − 1) · x. Therefore, for all ≤ 1, we have:
As in the set-cover proof, we split the set of possible outputs into two sets. We call an output sequence qgood for an agent I in instance A if this sum Moreover, note that since the total realized utility of any agent is at most 1, if agent I has realized utility u i−1 before the ith set is chosen, then β i is distributed in [0, 1 − u i−1 ]. Moreover, u i = u i−1 + β i . Lemma A.2 then implies that the probability that the algorithms outputs a (ln(eδ −1 ))-bad permutation is at most δ. The theorem follows.
Remark 1. By choosing
= /k, we immediately get -differential privacy and expected utility at least (1 − 1/e)OPT − O(k 2 ln m/ ). This may give better guarantees for some values of k and δ.
We remark that the k-coverage problem is a special case of the CPP problem. Therefore: Corollary 8.1. The CPP algorithm (with sets as resources) is an ( , δ)-differential privacy preserving algorithm for the k-coverage problem achieving approximation factor at least (1−1/e)OPT−O(k log m log(2/δ)/ ).
Truthfulness
The CPP problem can be viewed as a mechanism design problem when each agent i has a choice of whether to submit his actual valuation function f i , or to lie and submit a different valuation function f i if such a misrepresentation yields a better outcome for agent i. A mechanism is truthful if for every valuation function of agents j = i, and every valuation function f i of agent i, there is never a function f i = f i such that agent i can benefit by misrepresenting his valuation function as f i . Intuitively, a mechanism is approximately truthful if no agent can make more than a slight gain by not truthfully reporting. (M (f 1 , . . . , f i , . . . , f n ))] − γ Note that 0-truthfulness corresponds to the usual notion of (exact) truthfulness.
( , δ)-differential privacy in our setting immediately implies (2 + δ)-approximate truthfulness.We note that Papadimitriou et al. [28] showed that the CPP problem is inapproximable to an m 1 2 − multiplicative factor by any polynomial time 0-truthful mechanism. Our result shows that relaxing that to γ-truthfulness allows us to give a constant approximation to the utility whenever OPT ≥ 2k log m log(1/γ)/γ for any γ. The proof is almost identical to that of the lower bound Theorem 4.4 for k-median, and hence is omitted.
Steiner Forest
Consider the Steiner network problem, where we are given a metric space M = (V, d) on n points, and a (private) subset R ⊆ V × V of source-sink (terminal) pairs. The goal is to buy a minimum-cost set of edges E(R) ⊂ V 2 such that these edges connect up each terminal pair in R. As in previous cases, we give instructions in the form of a tree T = (V, E T ); each terminal pair (u, v) ∈ R takes the unique path P T (u, v) in this tree T between themselves, and the (implicit) solution is the set of edges E(R) = (u,v)∈R P T (u, v).
The tree T is given by the randomized construction of Fakcharoenphol et al. [13] , which guarantees that E[cost(E(R))] ≤ O(log n) · OPT; moreover, since the construction is oblivious to the set R, it preserves the privacy of the terminal pairs perfectly (i.e., = 0). The same idea can be used for a variety of network design problem (such as the "buy-at-bulk" problem) which can be solved by reducing it to a tree instance.
Private Amplification Theorem
In this section, we show that differentially private mechanisms that give good guarantees in expectation can be repeated privately to amplify the probability of a good outcome. First note that if we simply repeat a private algorithm T times, and select the best outcome, we can get the following result: 2 ), there is a mechanism M which satisfies the following properties:
• Utility: Pr[q(A, M (A)) ≥ Q] ≥ (1 − 2 −T ).
• Efficiency: M makes T calls to M .
• Privacy: M satisfies ( T )-differential privacy.
Note that the privacy parameter degrades linearly with T . Thus to bring down the failure probability to inverse polynomial, one will have to make T logarithmic. To get -differential privacy, one would then take to be /T . If Q was inversely proportional to , as is the case in many of our algorithms, this leads to an additional logarithmic loss. The next theorem shows a more sophisticated amplification technique that does better. 
